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This essay discusses the difficulty to reconcile two paradigms about beliefs: the binary
or categorical paradigm of yes/no beliefs and the probabilistic paradigm of degrees
of belief. The possibility for someone to hold both types of belief simultaneously
is challenged by the lottery paradox, and more recently by a general impossibility
theorem. The nature, relevance, and implications of the tension are explained and
assessed. A more technical elaboration can be found in Dietrich and List (2018, 2021).
1 Two types of belief and their potential coexistence
Rational-choice theory and logic have very different concepts of belief, each of which
enjoys significant appeal and wide applications. Rational-choice theory takes agents
to have graded beliefs of the form of subjective probability assignments. One might
believe that it rains with subjective probability 2/3, or that one will stay healthy
with subjective probability 3/4. By contrast, logic takes agents to have categorical
beliefs, of the form of ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (or abstention). One might believe that it rains,
or that one will stay healthy, in a categorical rather than graded sense. Believing
something categorically should not be confused with complete certainty, i.e., with
maximal graded belief: otherwise one would hardly ever believe anything in the
categorical sense.
The advantage for rational choice theory of assuming probabilistic beliefs is con-
siderable: it opens to the door to the classic notion of a rational agent seeking to
maximise expected utilities, since expected utilities are the result of combining the
probabilistic model of beliefs with the utility-based model of goals, values, or desires.
As such, probabilistic beliefs form an intrinsic part of the classic homo oeconomicus.
By contrast, logicians are less interested in decision making, and hence do not need
to combine beliefs with goals, values, or desires. Instead, they typically focus on
beliefs alone, which they usually take to be truth-oriented, logically consistent, and
deductively closed, and to evolve via reasoning and revision.
Of course, rational-choice theory has its own theory of belief revision: a highly
unified Bayesian theory, in which probabilistic beliefs undergo Bayesian updating as
new information arrives. But it is questionable whether Bayesianism yields a theory
of reasoning, and more generally whether probabilistic beliefs lend themselves to any
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form of reasoning at all. Indeed, reasoning is not revision, as it does not draw on new
information but rather on inference from existing beliefs. For logicians, reasoning
happens in language, and is a process of drawing conclusions from initially believed
premises. The categorical notion of beliefs lends itself much better to reasoning.
Rational choice theorists and logicians are both right in some sense, since both
models of belief fulfills the purpose set by the respective discipline. But can both
concepts of belief coexist in the same agent? Such an agent would for instance sim-
ultaneously believe that it rains with subjective probability 2/3 and believe that it
rains simpliciter. More generally, for any relevant proposition , the agent would hold
some subjective probability of  and hold some yes/no belief about . Depending on
the context, the agent might draw either on their categorical beliefs or on their graded
beliefs. In some contexts, the agent might reason logically with categorical beliefs by
drawing inferences from existing beliefs, thereby forming new beliefs. When learn-
ing information, the agent might on the one hand logically revise categorical beliefs,
and on the other hand Bayes-revise graded beliefs. In decision-making contexts, the
agent might either use a simple heuristic that draws on categorical beliefs, or use a
more sophisticated decision rule (possibly the expected-utility rule) that draws on
graded beliefs. In short, each type of belief would play a different functional role.
Neither type would be redundant, since each type is tailored to its own role, and each
type outperforms the other type in its own area of application. Under this attractive
division-of-labour picture, each belief type would be a legitimate component of the
agent’s psychology.
But this picture can only be maintained if the two belief types are mutually
compatible in some sense, i.e., if the agent can maintain categorical and graded beliefs
in a mutually coherent way. What exactly ‘coherence’ amounts to is a question on
its own, but roughly speaking one would expect the agent to categorically believe
propositions in which they have high degree of belief, and to categorically disbelieve
propositions in which they have low degree of belief.
The question of whether and how one can coherently hold both types of belief
has recently received renewed attention. See for instance contributions by Hawthorne
and Bovens (1999), Douven and Williamson (2006), Lin and Kelly (2012a, 2012b),
Leitgeb (2014), and Dietrich and List (2018, 2021).
2 A general impossibility theorem about coexistence of
both belief types
Our notion of ‘can coexist’ is normative, not positive. That is, we do not describe
real agents, but we ask whether an idealised agent — perhaps to be called a ‘rational’
agent — can coherently hold both belief types.
The coexistence of both belief types is challenged by the well-known lottery para-
dox (cf. the above-cited literature). The lottery paradox starts from a natural hy-
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pothesis about the relationship between both belief types: one believes a proposition
categorically if and only if one has a high enough degree of belief in it. The lot-
tery paradox is meant to illustrate that this hypothesis runs into a problem: even if
graded beliefs are perfectly rational, i.e., obey probability theory, the corresponding
set of categorical beliefs, formed in accordance with the mentioned hypothesis, can
be irrational, i.e., neither consistent nor deductively closed.
Why? In the lottery paradox, you are given a book of 100 pages. You know that
exactly one page is black and all others are white. You have no idea about which
page is black. So for each page you have a subjective probability of 99/100 that it is
white. This subjective probability is high enough to make you (categorically) believe
that the page is white. Meanwhile you have a subjective probability of 1 that not
all pages are white. This maximal subjective probability is of course high enough to
make you (categorically) believe that not all pages are white. The problem is: you
believe that the first page is white, that the second page is white, and so one; but you
fail to believe an implication of these 100 beliefs, namely that all pages are white —
a violation of deductive closure. Worse, you believe the opposite of this implication,
namely that not all pages are white — a violation of logical consistency.
Although the lottery paradox seems special in its setup, the underlying problem
is very general. This fact has long been recognized informally, and has recently been
established formally through an impossibility theorem derived in different versions
by Dietrich and List (2018, 2021). According to this theorem, the two belief types
cannot generally coexist subject to respecting certain initially plausible conditions.
What are these axiomatic conditions, informally?
Three conditions pertain just to one belief type. One of them requires the agent
to only ever hold a categorical belief set that is consistent and deductively closed.
Another one requires the agent to only ever hold degrees of belief that are probabil-
istically coherent (so that, for instance, the probability of ‘rain or snow’ is the sum of
the probabilities of ‘rain’ and ‘snow’). The remaining one pertains again to graded
beliefs and requires that any (probabilistically coherent) degrees of belief are allowed,
i.e., can be held jointly with some categorical beliefs.
Three further conditions pertain to the relationship between the two belief types.
One of them requires to categorically believe any proposition that has maximal sub-
jective probability 1. Another one requires that the two belief types impose at least
some non-trivial constraints on one another, rather than being essentially discon-
nected. The third condition requires that all relationships (i.e., mutual constraints)
between the two belief types take a ‘local’ rather than ‘global’ form, in a sense defined
below.
The impossibility theorem says that these axiomatic conditions are mutually in-
consistent. So, it is strictly impossible to hold beliefs of both types in accordance
with these axiomatic conditions.
To be a little more precise, let me sketch the formal setup. Consider a set  of
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propositions (or events) of interest; in the lottery paradox,  contains propositions
about which page(s) are white.1 The agent’s graded beliefs are represented by a
degree-of-belief function  that assigns to each proposition  ∈  a subjective
probability () ∈ [0 1]. The agent’s categorical beliefs are represented by a belief
set  ⊆ , containing the (categorically) believed propositions. In different contexts
the agent may hold different combinations () of a degree-of-belief function and
a belief set. But not every combination counts as coherent: some combinations are
coherent, the others are incoherent. Formally, coherence (or co-tenability) defines a
binary relation between degree-of-belief functions  and belief sets .
What is the structure of the coherence relation? The theorem assumes that the
relation satisfies six conditions. They were stated informally above. Here are more
formal re-statements:
• Categorical beliefs are logically coherent: all permissible belief sets  are logic-
ally consistent and deductively closed. “Permissible” means that  is coherent
with at least one degree-of-belief function .
• Graded beliefs are probabilistically coherent: any permissible degree-of-belief
function  obeys the laws of probability. “Permissible” means that  is
coherent with at least one belief set .
• No coherent graded beliefs are ruled out: every probabilistically coherent degree-
of-belief function  is permissible. “Permissible” was just defined.
• Completely certain propositions are categorically believed: for any coherent
combination () and any proposition  ∈ , if () = 1 then  ∈ .
• The two belief types are non-trivially connected: at least one (permissible)
degree-of-belief function  requires to believe some proposition  ∈  that
is not completely certain, i.e., satisfies () 6= 1. This rules out that only
completely certain propositions are ever required to be believed. Technically, a
degree-of-belief function  is said to “require” to believe a proposition  if 
is contained in all belief sets coherent with .
• The last condition, “locality”, is informally defined below.
The impossibility theorem states that these conditions are mutually incompat-
ible.2
1 ‘Propositions’ could for instance be modelled as sets of possible worlds, i.e., subsets of some fixed
underlying set Ω of possible worlds. This ‘semantic’ or ‘set-theoretic’ notion of proposition is common
in rational-choice theory and probability theory, where propositions are usually called ‘events’.
2The theorem assumes that the set  of propositions under consideration contains enough in-
terconnections, of the sort that some propositions in  entail or are inconsistent with some other
propositions in . In the absence of any interconnections, no impossibility could possibly occur,
since all belief sets  ⊆  would then be trivially consistent and deductively closed.
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A special kind of coherence relation deserves being mentioned: so-called functional
or deterministic relations, in which the graded beliefs always fully determine the
categorical beliefs. Formally, functionally means that each permissible degree-of-belief
function  is coherent with exactly one belief set . Such a functional relation can be
captured by a binarization function  which maps any (permissible) degree-of-belief
function  to the corresponding belief set  = ().
The mentioned impossibility result was initially stated under the assumption of
functionality, hence as a theorem about the inexistence of any binarization function
satisfying certain conditions (Dietrich and List 2018). To our later surprise, the
impossibility extends to the much more general case without functionality assumption
(Dietrich and List 2021). The non-functional case allows one’s categorical beliefs to be
related only very loosely to one’s graded beliefs: one’s degrees of belief could impose
almost no constraints on categorical beliefs, thereby leaving much freedom in what to
believe categorically. Despite such freedom, it remains impossible to hold both belief
types in accordance with the theorem’s plausible conditions.
3 What to make of the formal impossibility?
Different reactions to the impossibility are imaginable. Either one takes rational
agents to have only graded belief, no categorical beliefs — against the logical paradigm.
Or one takes rational agents to have only categorical beliefs, no graded beliefs —
against the rational-choice-theoretic paradigm. Or one maintains both belief types,
but gives up some of the conditions assumed in the incompatibility theorem. As a
matter of fact, most conditions in the theorem seem normatively inescapable. But
there are two important exceptions:
• One can give up locality. Locality demands that any implications of graded
beliefs for categorical beliefs are ‘local’, i.e., proposition-by-proposition. More
precisely, whether one’s graded beliefs require to believe a given proposition only
depends on the graded belief in this proposition (where “require to believe” was
defined above). For instance, if the graded beliefs require to believe in rain, then
changing the degree of belief in sunshine without changing the degree of belief
in rain does not lift the requirement to believe in rain. An example of a local
relation between both belief types is the mentioned hypothesis whereby one
believes a proposition categorically if and only if its subjective probability is high
enough. Locality is a strong demand. Many interesting non-local (‘holistic’)
ways to relate both belief types are presented in Dietrich and List (2018, 2021).
• More radically, one could turn to a different theory of graded beliefs, by giv-
ing up probabilistic beliefs in favour of some other notion of graded belief.
Multi-valued logic and ranking theory provide alternative kinds of graded be-
lief. Interestingly, ranking-theoretic beliefs (Spohn 2012) would escape the im-
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possibility and allow for a viable coexistence of graded and categorical beliefs.
Needless to say, orthodox rational-choice theory would be reluctant to replace
“their” probabilistic paradigm by an altogether different, albeit graded, notion
of belief.
References
Dietrich, Franz, and Christian List (2018) From degrees of belief to binary beliefs:
Lessons from judgment-aggregation theory, Journal of Philosophy 115: 225-270
Dietrich, Franz, and Christian List (2021) The relation between degrees of belief
and binary beliefs: a general impossibility theorem. In: I. Douven (ed.) Lotteries,
Knowledge, and Rational Belief. Essays on the Lottery Paradox, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2021, pp. 223-54
Hawthorne, James, and Luc Bovens (1999) The Preface, the Lottery, and the
Logic of Belief, Mind 108(430): 241—264
Leitgeb, Hannes (2014) The Stability Theory of Belief, Philosophical Review 123(2):
131—171
Lin, Hanti, and Kevin T. Kelly (2012a) “Propositional Reasoning that Tracks
Probabilistic Reasoning”, Journal of Philosophical Logic 41(6): 957—981
Lin, Hanti, and Kevin T. Kelly (2012b) A Geo-logical Solution to the Lottery
Paradox, Synthese 186(2): 531—575
Spohn, Wolfgang (2012) The Laws of Belief: Ranking Theory and Its Philosophical
Applications, Oxford: Oxford University Press
6
